

Abramson, P. R., Aldrich, J. H., Blais, A., Diamond, M., Diskin, A., Indridason, I. H., ... Levine, R. (2010). Comparing Strategic Voting Under FPTP and PR. *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(1), 61–90. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009341717>

Abramson et al find that voters are likely to desert parties that they do not believe will have power over policy outcomes after the election. Since there are more parties in PR systems, these systems experience more strategic voting than FPTP systems. See also: Barsted and Kedar (2009), Kedar (2005).

Asselin, Robert. (2014). “An Agenda for Democratic Reform in Canada.”

Asselin is “skeptical” of PR for Canada and suggests instead the use of a preferential ballot as it would ensure that winning candidates receive 50% of the vote. He also notes the potential benefits of mandatory voting.

Aucoin, Peter, Mark D. Jarvis and Lori Turnbull. (2011). *Democratizing the Constitution: Reforming Responsible Government*. Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications.

Aucoin et al. argue that the unwritten nature of much of Canada’s constitution have enabled Prime Ministers to centralize power in their office and that this has motivated a democratic deficit in Canada.

Bargsted, M. A., & Kedar, O. (2009). Coalition-Targeted Duvergerian Voting: How Expectations Affect Voter Choice under Proportional Representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2), 307–323. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00372.x>

Bargsted and Kedar find that voters consider the potential post-election coalitions. Voters desert unviable first preference parties in order to vote for another party who they see as a viable coalition partner and preferable to other coalition partners. See also: Abramson et al (2010) and Kedar (2005).

Benoit, K. (2004). Models of electoral system change. *Electoral Studies*, 23(3), 363–389. [http://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794\(03\)00020-9](http://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794(03)00020-9)

Benoit provides a comprehensive literature review of different models of electoral system change and establishes a typology of different explanations for such change. A new model is developed that explains electoral reform as the result of a coalition of parties who is empowered to change the electoral system and who expect to gain seats under a new system.

Bernauer, Julian et al. (January 2015). “Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of women and men, poor and rich?” *International Political Science Review* 36(1).

A study of 24 countries finds that more proportional electoral systems better reflect the interests of less wealthy citizens and, to a lesser degree, women.

Blais, André and Kees Aarts. (July 2006). "Electoral systems and turnout." *Acta Politica* 41(2).

Blais and Aarts summarize the large body of research that shows that systems of proportional representation are correlated with higher voter turnout.

Blais, André and Marc A. Bodet. (December 2006). "Does proportional representation foster closer congruence between citizens and policy makers?" *Comparative Political Studies* 39(10).

Proportional representation has two contradictory tendencies: a greater number of less centrist parties and more coalition governments that pull policy toward the centre. These tendencies wash out, leading to no real effect on congruence between voters and parties.

Blais, André and R. Kenneth Carty. (1990). "Does proportional representation foster voter turnout?" *European Journal of Political Research* 18(2).

Regression analysis across 20 countries identifies PR systems as a cause of higher voter turnout. More recent research has questioned whether or not electoral systems increase voter turnout, see Blais (2006).

Blais, André, Agnieszka Dobrzynska, and Indridi H. Indridason. "To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice." *British Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 1 (2005): 182–90.

Blais et al. argue that countries switched to proportional representation at the beginning of the 20th century in response to the spread of democratic ideals and the need to ensure representation for a multi-party system.

Blau, Adrian. (2008) "Electoral Reform in the UK: A Veto Player Analysis." In *To Keep or To Change First Past The Post?*, edited by André Blais, 61–89. Oxford University Press.

Blau points out that many political actors may desire reform, particularly small parties who receive fewer seats than is predicted by their share of the popular vote. However, although reform may make it onto the agenda, it is hard for it to pass because those who would benefit from change often have the ability to veto reform or design reform processes to fail.

Boix, C. (1999). Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. *The American Political Science Review*, 93(3), 609. <http://doi.org/10.2307/2585577>

Boix argues that countries switch to proportional representation when strong new parties arise and there is no single dominant old party as this allows the old parties to maintain a greater share of the seats. If new parties are weak, the system will not be changed.

Cameron, Maxwell. (October 2015). *Trust and Confidence: Post-Election Cooperation in Parliament*. Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Retrieved from <http://www.democracy.arts.ubc.ca/2015/10/06/post-election-cooperation/>

Cameron seeks to address the misinformation surrounding minority and coalition governments. He notes that both are perfectly legitimate, and quite common in other countries with a parliamentary system. He also argues that minority and coalition governments could be beneficial for Canada. Minority and coalition governments force cooperation between parties, which leads to less hyper-partisanship, as well as policies that are more representative of a majority of Canadians. Canada's healthcare program, as well as the pension program, were enacted during periods of minority governments.

Carey, John M. and Simon Hix. (February 2011). "The electoral sweet spot: low-magnitude proportional electoral systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2).

Carey and Hix argue that majoritarian systems limit party fragmentation and simple government coalitions while proportional systems limit the problem of disproportional results. They argue that the trade-offs between these two sets of benefits are not linear and that proportional representation with low magnitude districts, such as MMP, can produce the benefits of both systems.

Coletto, David and Maciej Czop (conducted for the Broadbent Institute). (December 2015). *Canadian electoral reform: public opinion on possible alternatives*. Abacus Data. Retrieved from http://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/canadian_electoral_reform

A report summarizing an in-depth survey on electoral reform conducted by the Broadbent Institute, a pro-reform, left-leaning thinktank. The results show that Canadians are largely divided on the issue of reform and many lack relevant knowledge.

Coyne, Andrew. (September 2016). "Minority Rule by Any Other Name." *The Walrus.ca*. Retrieved from <https://thewalrus.ca/minority-rule-by-any-other-name/>.

Coyne argues that FPTP provides governments with considerable power to implement a mandate without support of a majority of the popular vote. As such, he suggests that Canada has minority rule that undermines the importance of majority rule to democracy.

Coyne, Andrew. (January 2016). "What problem is electoral reform supposed to solve? Here are a couple, to start." *National Post*. Retrieved from <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/andrew-coyne-what-problem-is-electoral-reform-supposed-to-solve-here-are-a-couple-to-start>

Coyne argues that the current system awards parties with 'false majorities,' gives votes unequal value, and exacerbates regional tensions.

Curtice, John. (2013) "Politicians, Voters and Democracy: The 2011 UK Referendum on the Alternative Vote." *Electoral Studies* 32, no. 2 (June): 215–23. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2012.10.010.

Curtice summarizes the UK referendum on the alternative vote in 2011 and argues that the decision to hold a referendum and that this triggered a coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats that ultimately failed to convince voters to take the same position.

Cutler, Fred, Richard Johnston, R. Kenneth Carty, André Blais, and Patrick Fournier (2008). "Deliberation, Information, and Trust: The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly as Agenda Setter." In *Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly*, edited by Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse, 166–92. Cambridge University Press.

Cutler et al. find that citizens who know little about electoral reform trusted the recommendation of the citizens assembly when they learned about it, although this recommendation was less useful for those who were well-informed about electoral reform.

Duch, R. M., May, J., & Armstrong, D. A. (2010). Coalition-directed Voting in Multiparty Democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 104(04), 698–719. <http://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000420>

Duch et al. demonstrate that voters regularly foresee the different policies that different coalitions will implement and vote for a particular coalition in an attempt to bring about the policies that they desire.

Fournier, Patrick, Henk van der Volk, R. Kenneth Carty, Andre Blais, and Jonathan Rose. *When Citizens Decide*. Oxford: 2011.

Fournier et al. study citizen assemblies (CA) on electoral reform in Ontario, British Columbia, and the Netherlands. They find that the processes tend to be sincere and truth-seeking, but expensive, time consuming, and not necessarily effective at translating into CA outcomes into public policy. Thus, while CAs are useful policy tools, they are not always appropriate or effective choices for policy making.

Herrmann, M. (2014). Polls, coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 26(3), 442–467. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0951629813505722>

Herrmann uses evidence from Austria and Germany to show that voters in proportional representation systems vote strategically. Specifically, when there are four or more parties, leftist voters are more likely to vote for centrist parties when they think that there will be a right leaning coalition government (and vice-versa).

Kedar, O. (2005). When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections. *The American Political Science Review*, 99(2), 185–199.

Kedar finds that voters foresee the possible post-election coalitions and the resulting policy outcomes. As a result, they may vote for more extreme parties than they would ordinarily support in an attempt to drag the coalition's policy to the right or left, depending on their policy preference.

Law Commission of Canada. (2004). *Voting counts: Electoral reform for Canada*. Government of Canada. Retrieved from <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/J31-61-2004E.pdf>

The Law Commission of Canada recommends that Canada adopt a form of mixed-member

proportional representation (MMP). It explores the history of electoral reform undertaken by other states -- especially New Zealand -- and finds that MMP would balance proportionality and local representation, which it suggests is a good fit for the Canadian context.

Leemann, Lucas and Isabela Mares. (May 2012, unpublished). “The adoption of proportional representation.”

Leduc, Lawrence (2009). “The Failure of Electoral Reform Proposals in Canada.” *Political Science* 61, no. 2 (December): 21–40. doi:10.1177/00323187090610020301.

Leduc argues that electoral reform is difficult to accomplish because elites can do much to sabotage the process, such as withholding funding for public education, setting referendum thresholds and timing, and determining whether or not there is a citizens’ assembly.

Lijphart, Arend. (2012). *Patterns of democracy (second edition)*. Yale University Press.

Lijphart concludes that proportional systems have higher turnout, better reflect the views of median voters, increase citizen satisfaction, increases the parties in parliament, and reduces the number of ‘manufactured majorities’

Norris, Pippa. (July 1997). “Choosing electoral systems: proportional, majoritarian, and mixed systems.” *International Political Science Review* 18(3).

Norris provides an overview of three main types of electoral systems, the normative ideas that underwrite them, and their effects. The article provides this classification on elections in 53 democracies.

McKenna, Peter. (2016). “Opting out of Electoral Reform – Why PEI Chose the Status Quo.” *Policy Options*. Accessed May 17, 2016.
<http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/accountability/opting-out-of-electoral-reform-why-pei-chose-the-status-quo/>.

Moscrop, David. (2016). “An electoral system for all,” Broadbent Institute.

Moscrop argues that proportional representation is fitting for Canada, since as an electoral system it will generate outcomes that are fair, representative, and engaging. He argues that proportional systems are better suited to contemporary democratic expectations and sensibilities

Rodden, Jonathan. (2009). “Why did Western Europe adopt proportional representation? A political geography explanation.” Working paper. Retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/~jrodde/wp/rodde_jan10_workshop_final.docx

Russell, Peter H. (2008). *Two cheers for minority government: the evolution of Canadian parliamentary democracy*. Emond Montgomery Publications Limited.

Russell argues that minority governments have been beneficial for Canada. He goes through the different minority governments Canada has seen, and argues that they were actually extremely productive. Canada's national healthcare program and pension plan were enacted under minority governments. Russell argues that minority and coalition governments should be seen as viable forms of government, and not just as periods in between majority governments.

Salmond, Rob. (May 2006). "Proportional representation and female parliamentarians." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(2).

Shugart, M. S. (2008). Inherent and Contingent Factors in Reform Initiation in Plurality Systems. In A. Blais (Ed.), *To Keep or To Change First Past The Post?: The Politics of Electoral Reform* (pp. 7–60). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Shugart argues that parties initiate reform when they see it as "electorally beneficial" because there is both public opinion to support reform and because the government believes they would win more seats in future elections with a rule change.

Thomas, Paul G. (2016). "Comparing Electoral Systems: Criteria, Advantages and Disadvantages, and the Process for Finding a Consensus on Which System is Best for Canada." Unpublished Paper, University of Manitoba.

Vowles, J. (1995). "The Politics of Electoral Reform in New Zealand." *International Political Science Review* 16, no. 1 (January): 95–115. doi:10.1177/019251219501600107.

A summary of the 1992 and 1993 referendums on electoral reform in New Zealand. Vowles finds that the government attempted to block electoral reform but that it succeeded due to the strong dissatisfaction with the current system.

Vowles, Jack. (2013). "Campaign Claims, Partisan Cues, and Media Effects in the 2011 British Electoral System Referendum." *Electoral Studies* 32, no. 2 (June): 253–64. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2012.10.009.

Vowles shows that voters in the 2011 British referendum on electoral reform changed their minds over the course of the campaign based on both accurate information and misinformation, ultimately rejecting a change to the alternative vote.

Warren, Mark E., and Hilary Pearse. (2008). "Introduction: Democratic Renewal and Deliberative Democracy." In *Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly*, edited by Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse, 1–19. Cambridge University Press.

Warren and Pearse suggest that citizen assemblies are capable of encouraging ordinary citizens to make informed choices and are particularly useful for issues, like electoral reform, where politicians have vested interests.